During a recent medical check‐up in Michigan, I was asked to sign a form that read 'I know that the practice of medicine is not an exact science and that outcomes may be different for each patient.' The current pandemic brings home the point that epidemiology is not an 'exact science'; it showcases the epistemological agenda in science studies, as it exemplifies the complex nature of the relationship between human‐made medical (or any other) science and the reality it seeks to understand. While some basic consensus on hygienic rules during COVID‐19 outbreak has been achieved, a scientific consensus regarding the nature and impact of the pandemic is lacking; even the number of those infected is not clear. Conspiracy theories aside, the views of scientists and doctors on the virus range from 'a little bit more contagious than the flu' to 'the virus affects the lungs, but it is not pneumonia; ventilators harm rather than help'. Passing their verdicts, scientists rely on some perceivable 'manifestations' of the virus. Their task is to come up with a theory that would relate these to the 'reality' underneath.

This take on scientific truth -- that we formulate interpretative schemes connecting some (arbitrarily) chosen facts -- results from the work of Ludwik Fleck, a Polish‐Israeli epidemiologist. Reflecting epistemologically on his experience as a scientist and on the history of medicine, Fleck used syphilis as a case study to suggest that explanations of disease depend on wider epistemological frameworks that are considered valid by academic communities at a particular historical period, be they the ire of gods or the work of bacteria: 'Whatever is known has always seemed systematic, proven, applicable and evident to the knower. Every alien system of knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful or mystical.' The premises of science are subject to continuous modifications, and we can never be sure whether our understanding of natural reality is 'final' or subject to revision.

The famous *House, M.D*. series illustrates this pattern. House, confronted with 'symptoms', i.e. manifestations of something going on inside a patient's body, has to come up with an explanation that connects these facts in non‐contradictory way. Similarly, scientists trying to understand COVID‐19 today cannot always distinguish 'true' manifestations from symptoms which may be unrelated to the condition. An even bigger problem is that no one can tell House whether he guesses right: the only proof is in 'praxis', i.e. the patient's recovery. Which, again, does not necessarily mean that the suggested interpretative scheme uncovers the true nature of the disease: it may just work for this particular case, for whatever reason. House does not discover laws of nature, but rather *invents* them according to the theoretical frameworks believed by what Fleck called the 'thought collective' to be representative of the nature of things. This classical yet also new agenda in science studies seeks to explore what exactly 'non‐contradiction' means here and now and how this knowledge works, performs and is constructed.
